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Albany Law School of Union University
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the lower court properly rule that mercury is a solid for
purposes of RCRA § 7002(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)(B)?
2. Did the lower court err in holding that Friends of Lake Tokay,
Inc. lacks standing to bring suit against Buena Vista?
3. Did the lower court properly rule that New Union has stand-
ing to bring suit against Buena Vista?
4. Did the lower court erroneously hold that the Clean Air Act,
§§ 7401 et seq., justifies refusal to exercise its equitable
authority under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B)?
* This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions, other than
minor technical revisions, have been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environ-
mental Law Review.
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5. Should the court rule on whether the Appellants are barred
from bringing action under RCRA § 7002(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b), or the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel? If so, should it hold that the Appellants are precluded?
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. (hereinafter FLT), a non-profit or-
ganization, brought a citizen suit pursuant to the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (hereinafter RCRA) against Buena
Vista Power Company (hereinafter Buena Vista). The State of
New Union intervened pursuant to RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E). The United States Court for the District of
New Union granted a motion of summary judgment against both
plaintiffs, concluding that their claims were barred by the Clean
Air Act, §§ 7401 et seq. The court further held that FLT lacked
standing. The Court withheld judgment on the issue of whether
such suit is barred under RCRA, or the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. FLT and New Union now appeal the sum-
mary judgment decision. Buena Vista cross appeals the court's
finding that New Union has standing and that mercury emissions
are solid waste.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FLT is a not-for-profit environmental advocacy group formed
to protect Lake Tokay in the State of New Union. (R. at 3, 6.)
Buena Vista operates two coal fired power plants, specifically
mine-mouth plants, within the State of Blue Skies. (R. at 3.) Mer-




the coal. (R. at 3.) Buena Vista admits that these mercury parti-
cles travel up the smoke stacks and are released into the atmos-
phere, escaping its pollution control equipment. (R. at 3.)
FLT sent notice of the alleged endangerment and its intent to
sue under RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E), to the
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA), the State of
Blue Skies, and Buena Vista. (R. at 3.) "Ninety-five days thereaf-
ter, FLT filed this action under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) against
Buena Vista, seeking an injunction requiring Buena Vista to cease
all emissions of mercury from its plants." (R. at 3.) Following the
commencement of this action, the State of New Union intervened
pursuant to RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E) and FED. R. Civ. P. 24. (R. at
3.)
Both the State of New Union and FLT contend that the parti-
cles of mercury are carried through the air into the territory of
New Union, where they later fall to the surface. (R. at 3.) These
mercury particles fall directly into Lake Tokay and the watershed
surrounding the area. (R. at 3-4.) As a result of the mercury
poisoning, the New Union Department of Public Health "issued a
health advisory," which has banned the sale of all fish caught in
Lake Tokay. (R. at 4.) Further, the Department of Public Health
has warned the public that the fish, "if eaten on a weekly basis,
could cause mercury poisoning in humans," and has advised
against any consumption of such fish. (R. at 4.)
EPA has performed studies of Lake Tokay and its watershed.
(R. at 4.) These studies have indicated that Buena Vista's power
plants are the direct cause of the poisoning of Lake Tokay. (R. at
4.) Buena Vista admits that according to EPA, most of the mer-
cury pollution of Lake Tokay comes from its power plants. (R. at
4.) However, Buena Vista denies the validity of EPA studies and
the conclusions drawn. (R. at 4.)
Buena Vista currently operates its power plants under regu-
lations promulgated under the Clean Air Act (hereinafter CAA).
(R. at 4.) Such regulations provide for Buena Vista to operate
under valid permits, which were issued by the State of Blue Skies.
(R. at 4.) However, such "permits did not contain limitations on
mercury emission." (R. at 4.) The permits merely require "Buena
Vista to conduct weekly monitoring of mercury in its emissions
and of mercury deposition, from its plants' emissions, at various
locations in Blue Skies." (R. at 8.) The record is devoid of any
indication that Buena Vista applied for, or is currently operating
2000] 493
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under, a valid RCRA permit, and therefore one could assume no
permit was issued.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves a violation of RCRA. The case begins with a
determination of whether the mercury poison discarded into Lake
Tokay is a solid. In order for RCRA to apply, an affirmative deter-
mination of this issue is required. A detailed examination of
RCRA indicates that Congress agreed with the "advancements of
modern science" when it treated mercury as a solid pursuant to
RCRA. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
Such a determination means that RCRA is the applicable statute.
The next issue is whether FLT should have standing to sue
Buena Vista. A positive determination of this issue should be
reached by closely examining the national intent in adding citizen
suit provisions to environmental statutes during the early 1970s.
Congress has added very broad citizen suit amendments to the
CAA and RCRA in recognition of the fact the government was do-
ing an inadequate job of enforcement. Members of FLT have been
directly injured from the mercury emissions from Buena Vista's
power plants. Therefore, to deny standing to FLT would directly
contradict Congress's intent.
New Union, similar to FLT, should have standing because it
was injured by the mercury emitted from Buena Vista's power
plants. A state has standing when "the injury alleged affects the
general population of a state in a substantial way .... " Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 767 (1981). There is a grave risk to the
people in New Union because the mercury has affected their land
and waters. The food they eat and the water they drink has been
contaminated. A warning has been placed on the consumption of
fish in Lake Tokay, however, that is not sufficient in that it does
not stop the animals or the unknowing public from eating the fish.
(R. at 4.) The injury is traceable to the mercury, which is released
from the coal burned in Buena Vista's two plants. Buena Vista
admits that "EPA had conducted studies which conclude that most
of the mercury in Lake Tokay originates from Buena Vista's two
power plants in Blue Skies." (R. at 4.) The lower court held that
"as a state, it does not need to plead standing." (R. at 7.) The
court further held that New Union automatically has standing to
sue for injuries that occur within its boundaries, specifically Lake
Tokay. (R. at 7.) RCRA § 7002 offers protection to health and the
environment, therefore, New Union's injuries are within the zone
494 [Vol. 17
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of interests sought to be protected. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972. "RCRA § 7002 vests this court with the authority to grant
injunctive relief. . . ." (R. at 6.) Therefore, the injuries sustained
by New Union are redressable under RCRA. See RCRA § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972.
Simply because Buena Vista was operating under a Clean Air
Act permit should not bar Appellant's suit under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The purpose of the
RCRA citizen suit provision is to allow any person to commence an
action against parties disposing of hazardous waste, which may
impose a "substantial endangerment" to that party. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). New Union was directly injured by the poisoning
of its land from Buena Vista's power plants.
In Dague v. City of Burlington, the court looked at the intent
of the statute and determined that its enactment was designed to
provide equitable relief for those injured by polluters. 935 F.2d
1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991). A permit issued under RCRA would
presumptively preclude any suit under such statute. See Green-
peace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1180 (6th
Cir. 1993). However, there is nothing in RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) which prevents suit under other federal
regulations. Buena Vista was never issued a RCRA permit for the
disposal of mercury, and therefore, New Union should not be pre-
cluded from equitable relief.
The Appellants are not barred from bringing this action solely
based upon RCRA § 7002 or the doctrine of res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel for a number of reasons. The court cannot rely on
Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co., as a reason to bar the
Appellants. First, there was no judgment on the merits of the
case, it was simply a grant of summary judgment. Secondly, an
obvious difference is that the plaintiffs in Bluepeace are not par-
ties of interest in the present case. New Union is a state, and
along with FLT, the citizens group, they should have the right to
bring this suit. Additionally, New Union had no notice of the issu-
ance of the permits or notice of the prior lawsuit against Buena
Vista (R. at 9). The lawsuit, which the Appellee relies on, fails to
sufficiently meet the requirements of the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S.
110, 130 (1983); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). If the
court should choose to rule on this issue, it should hold that Buena
Vista is not precluded from answering this suit.
2000] BRIEF 495
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
MERCURY EMITTED IN PARTICLE FORM FROM
BUENA VISTA'S COAL BURNING POWER
PLANTS IS A SOLID WASTE FOR PURPOSES
OF RCRA § 7002(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)(B).
The district court accurately interpreted the law in ruling
that mercury is a solid waste under RCRA § 7002(a)(2)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)(B). Their decision was based on a detailed ex-
amination of existing statutory law. The court read the applicable
statute defining solid waste. The court then scoured the list for
exceptions. Mercury particles are not one of the listed exceptions.
For that reason, the court correctly ruled that mercury is a solid
waste.
A. The Solid Waste Discarded from Buena Vista's Power Plants
is a Hazardous Waste for Purposes of RCRA
§ 7002(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)(B).
Solid waste is defined as "any discarded material that is not
excluded by § 261.4(a) or that is not excluded by variance granted
under §§ 260.30 and 260.31." 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.30, 260.31, 261.2
(1999). Those sections do not exclude mercury. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2 (1999). Congress granted EPA the power to promulgate
such regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1). The Code further
states in § 261.2(a)(2) that a discarded material is one that is
"abandoned," "recycled," or "inherently waste-like."
The term "inherently waste-like" is defined in paragraph (d)
of the same section. Specifically, it states that materials listed in
Appendix VIII of Part 261 which are not reused or recycled and
which "may pose a substantial hazard to human health and the
environment," meet the criteria of being "inherently waste-like
materials." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(d)(3)(B)(ii). It is uncontested that
mercury is hazardous to both health and the environment, there-
fore it meets the criteria set forth in the regulation. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(d)(3)(B)(ii).
RCRA § 1004(5) defines hazardous waste as "a solid waste
which has characteristics that are hazardous" (R. at 5). More spe-
cifically, "[a] solid waste ... is a hazardous waste if... it is listed
in subpart D of this part and has not been excluded from the lists
in subpart D of this part under §§ 260.20 and 260.22 of this chap-




Compounds of mercury are listed three separate times in sub-
part D. The three forms are (1) "Mercury", (2) "Mercury, (acetato-
0) phenyl-", and (3) "Mercury fulminate." 40 C.F.R. § 261.33
(1999). The corresponding EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers are
U151, P092, and P065, respectively. See id. These forms of mer-
cury are not excluded as hazardous waste by any other section of
the Code.
These lists have been promulgated by EPA in accordance with
42 U.S.C. § 6921. In fact, in passing the Code, the legislature paid
particular attention to by-products of coal burning power plants,
specifically, "[fily ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and
flue gas emission control waste generated primarily from the com-
bustion of coal or other fossil fuels." 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A)(i).
As a by-product of coal burning, the mercury emitted by Buena
Vista is one of the poisons Congress intended to regulate.
B. Even if Mercury Particles Were not Specifically Listed in
Subpart D, a Reasonable Interpretation of the Code
Would Emphasize the Importance of Preventing
Mercury Pollution.
Considering that mercury is listed in three separate forms in
subpart D, there should not be a question that the legislature per-
ceived it to be a hazardous solid waste that society should be pro-
tected from. Such intent is further emphasized in 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.4, the section which lists the exclusions and exceptions of
hazardous waste. For example, § 261.4(a)(14)(ii) indicates that
shredded circuit boards that are being recycled are not hazardous
waste, "provided they are: [firee of mercury switches," and "mer-
cury relays." The specific inclusion of mercury further under-
scores the legislative intent to prevent the proliferation of
mercury pollution.
Buena Vista concedes that it emits mercury particles into the
atmosphere. (R. at 3.) Buena Vista's only contention is that those
particles are not solids. Under RCRA, a reasonable interpretation
of the statute includes mercury particles as a solid hazardous
waste. Another reasonable definition of a "particle" is provided by
Webster's dictionary. It defines "particle" as "a minute part or
portion of matter, the aggregation of which parts constitutes the
whole mass." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY
1307 (2d ed. 1978). In other words, the minuteness of the parti-
cles is irrelevant to the issue of whether they are solids. As the
district court accurately noted, any argument that mercury is not
2000] 497
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a solid "ignores the advancements of modern science" (R. at 5) (cit-
ing Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959)).
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, INC. LACKS
STANDING.
The district court's decision in Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc v.
Buena Vista Power Co. accurately stated the law. The error arose
from the way it applied the facts to that law in reaching its
conclusion.
For an individual to have standing, the individual must show
three things. First, he or she must have personally suffered some
injury as a result of the action in question. See Gladstone, Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). Second, the
injury must be fairly traceable to the complained of action. Third,
the injury must be redressable by judicial action. See Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-41 (1976);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Additionally,
the plaintiff must show that his or her injury is "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). It
is uncontested that two members of FLT meet these requirements.
"As an environmental advocacy group, FLT cannot have
standing on its own, but may have standing to represent its mem-
bers who have standing." (R. at 6.) In order for an association to
have standing it must meet a three part representational test.
First, some of its members must possess standing in their own
right. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Second, the interests the group is seeking to
protect must be germane to the purpose of the organization. See
id. Third, "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires the participation in the lawsuit of each of the individual
members." Id.
The citizen suit provision of RCRA provides the framework
for appellant's claim of standing. See RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). When examined alongside existing




A. Two Members of FLT Have Been Injured.
Buena Vista does not contest that Steven Jones and Artimus
Winfred have been injured, but the full extent of FLT's injuries
should not be overlooked. Appellee and the lower court have
greatly oversimplified the nature of Appellant's injury. When
presented with evidence that the fish of Lake Tokay are poisoned
by mercury from Buena Vista's power plant, the company's
archaic advice to avoid contamination is "don't eat the fish."
While the simplicity of this rationale is somewhat appealing, it is
inaccurate and impossible. In fact, the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry acknowledges that "[b]reathing va-
pors in air from spills, incinerators, and industries that burn
mercury-containing fuels" can also lead to exposure. Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs (last modified
Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts46.html>. Fur-
thermore, mercury exposure can have deleterious effects on the
brain, kidneys and developing fetuses. See id. Other symptoms
include "lung damage, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, increases in
blood pressure or heart rate, skin rashes, and eye irritation." Id.
In short, cessation of fish consumption will not completely prevent
Appellants from further injury should Buena Vista continue to
pollute the lake and surrounding environment.
Even if it were possible, as Appellee contends, to completely
avoid mercury poisoning by means of not eating the fish, Jones
and Winfred still have a significant legal interest in the lake. One
court addressed such interests when it found that individuals can
be "aggrieved" by "aesthetic, conservational, recreational aspects,"
as opposed to strictly economic injuries. Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d
Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court later mentions those same inju-
ries "to emphasize that standing may stem from them as well as
from . . .economic injury . . . ." Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Additionally,
as any fisherman will testify, the loss of a good fishing hole is a
serious "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" injury.
B. Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. Meets the Supreme Court's Test
for Representational Standing.
Having established that at least two members of FLT possess
standing in their own right, one must examine whether FLT
meets the other two parts of the Supreme Court's test for repre-
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sentational standing. Those two parts being whether the inter-
ests at stake are "germane" to the purpose of the organization and
that "neither the claim asserted nor relief requested requires the
participation of the individual members." Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342.
As "a not-for-profit corporation organized for the protection of
Lake Tokay," this suit falls squarely within FLT's charter (R. at
3.) In fact, the poisoning of Lake Tokay is the exact type of scena-
rio, which the group was formed to prevent. With regard to the
third part of the Supreme Court's representational test, neither
the claim of endangerment, nor the request for an injunction to
cease all mercury emissions from Buena Vista's power plants re-
quire individualized proof. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. For these
reasons, FLT's claims are "properly resolved in a group context."
Id.
C. The Injuries are Within the "Zone of Interests" of RCRA.
The fact that Buena Vista concedes an injury is only part of
the injury requirement. The injury must also be within the "zone
of interests" of the statute. Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,153 (1970). "The overriding interest
of RCRA is clear: to prevent generation of hazardous waste in the
first place, and to dispose of and treat properly that which is pro-
duced." Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995). In
fact, "RCRA itself states that the objectives of the Act 'are to pro-
mote the protection of health and the environment and to conserve
valuable material and energy resources . . . ."' Id. at 1097.
Given that language, there should be no question that a resi-
dent's concern regarding the poisoning of their lake by out of state
power plants falls directly within the statute's zone of interests.
D. The Injuries of FLT's Members are Traceable to Buena
Vista's Actions.
The district court states that "[it remains to be proven
whether the injury is fairly traceable to Buena Vista's emissions
." (R. at 6.) This statement is inconsistent with the court's
earlier finding that the mercury in the lake came from the smoke-
stacks of Buena Vista Power Company. (R. at 5.) Considering the
court's language in Part I of their decision regarding the particu-
late emissions as solid or hazardous waste; "[t]his seems a good
description of what happens to the mercury particles; they are dis-




surrounding land, from which they eventually enter the Lake."
Id.
While Buena Vista denies that the mercury in Lake Tokay
originated from its power plants, its denial ignores the findings of
EPA, a non-partisan party. The evidence uncovered by EPA di-
rectly implicates Buena Vista's power plants as the source of the
mercury poison in the Lake. (R. at 4). Buena Vista responds with
a technical argument saying mercury is not a solid waste. (R. at
5.) Should the court decide that mercury is a solid, then there
should be no question that the mercury poisoning is traceable to
Buena Vista.
E. The Injuries are Redressable.
The district court erred in deciding FLT's injuries were not
redressable by pigeon-holing multiple serious injuries into "incon-
veniences" that "may have a modest economic value." (R. at 6.)
The court explained that "[o]ne of the bedrock requirements for
the equitable remedy of injunction is that relief is not available in
an action at law." Id. Its decision appears to have been based pri-
marily upon Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F.Supp.
990 (D. Kan. 1997).
The court below relies on a non-binding lower court decision,
which disregarded the Congressional intent. Consider the under-
lying facts in the Davies case. There, the case involved serious
groundwater contamination by the defendant. The district court's
solution to what it concedes to be serious pollution of drinking
water is "the threat of exposure can always be avoided by evacuat-
ing property where hazardous waste is found or by taking other
extraordinary measures." Davies, 963 F.Supp. at 999. The Davies
court further states that the plaintiffs "must use bottled water in-
stead of groundwater," admitting that is "an inconvenience and an
economic burden," but suggesting that such is an injury is one
that can be settled in an action at law. Id.
Such rationale is in direct conflict with the legislative intent
of prevention, as noted in RCRA and other environmental legisla-
tion. The district court suggests that money damages are availa-
ble to FLT for the loss of being able to eat the fish. This response
misses the point, RCRA is designed to be a proactive statute.
"RCRA's goal is to prevent the creation of hazardous waste sites,
rather than to promote the cleanup of existing sites." Furrer v.
Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995).
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F. This Case Illustrates the Rationale of Congress Enacting
Citizen Suit Provisions in the First Place.
In order to fully appreciate the reason why FLT should have
standing in this case, one must examine the rise of citizen suit
provisions in environmental statutes. Their first appearance was
in the 1970 CAA, shortly after the first Earth Day. At the time,
there existed a widespread belief that the government was not do-
ing an effective job of enforcing antipollution statutes. Consider
the language used in House Report 91-1146 when describing Con-
gressional efforts to improve the environment. It states that "[a]
review [of the previous laws] make[s it] abundantly clear that the
strategies which we have pursued in the war against air pollution
have been inadequate in several important respects, and the
methods employed in implementing those strategies often have
been slow and less effective than they might have been." H.R.
REP. No. 1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356. The
Senate was more forthright one year later when discussing the
addition of a citizen suit provision to the Water Pollution Control
Act when it states; "[tihe record shows an almost total lack of en-
forcement." S. REP. No. 414 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672.
After appearing in the CAA, the citizen suit provisions were
quickly added to nearly all other environmental legislation. In
fact, most of the citizen statutes were remarkably similar, if not
identical, causing courts to use prior judicial treatment of one to
help interpret another. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Baugh-
man v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge &
Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1136 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985).
By enacting the citizen suit provisions, Congress hoped to
"motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility
to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings." S. REP. No.
1196 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 36, 37. The self-de-
scribed purpose of the legislation was "to speed up, expand, and
intensify the war against air pollution in the United States. .. "
H.R. REP. No. 1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356.
One court accurately summarized the legislative intent by stating
that "Congress intended citizen suits to both goad the responsible
agencies to more vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution stan-
dards, and if the agencies remained inert, to provide an alterna-
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tive enforcement mechanism." Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.,
592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1978).
This language highlights the importance of reversing the dis-
trict court's "no standing" ruling. This is an example of good gov-
ernment and a healthy legislative process. Buena Vista's power
plants have been polluting the State of New Union. New Union
was not doing anything about it, so the citizens of the state, in the
form of FLT, sought an "alternative enforcement mechanism" pro-
vided to them by their representatives in Washington. By doing
so, FLT "goad [ed]" a previously "inert" state into acting. Prevent-
ing them from doing so quashes the very basis of our environmen-
tal laws and ignores the intent of our nation's Congress.
III. NEW UNION HAS STANDING TO BRING SUIT
AGAINST BUENA VISTA BECAUSE INJURIES
OCCURRED WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES,
THEREFORE, THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SHOULD UPHOLD THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION.
The lower court held that New Union has standing "because a
state need not prove standing." (R. at 4.) New Union is a state,
not a private party. (R. at 7.) "As a state, it does not need to plead
standing"; it automatically has standing to sue for injuries alleg-
edly occurring within its boundaries. (R. at 7.) New Union claims
that Lake Tokay is within its boundaries and within its public do-
main. (R. at 7.) "A State is a... 'person' under RCRA and is thus
entitled to sue under these provisions." United States Dep't of En-
ergy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 616 (1992).
The Supreme Court, in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to
Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986), found that a
state has standing when it alleges "a judicially cognizable interest
in the preservation of its own sovereignty, and a diminishment of
that sovereignty by the alleged interference. . . ." Id. (citing Pub-
lic Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment v. Heckler,
613 F.Supp. 558, 567 (E.D. Cal. 1985)). Standing reflects a due
regard for the autonomy of those most likely to be affected by the
judicial decision. "The exercise of judicial power .. .can so pro-
foundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it
extends." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
To meet standing requirements, one must show that: (1) they
suffered actual injury from the complained of action, (2) the injury
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is fairly traceable to the complained of action, and (3) the injury is
redressable by judicial action. See id. The injury must also be
within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute.
See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
It has become a settled doctrine that "a State has standing to
sue only when it's sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are im-
plicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal
claims of its citizens." Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660,
663 (1976).
To have standing to sue under the parens patriae doctrine, a
state must assert an injury to a quasi-sovereign interest. "'Parens
patriae,' literally 'parent of the country', refers traditionally to role
of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disabil-
ity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
Therefore, in order to maintain a standing action, the state
must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular
private parties, (i.e. the state must be more than a nominal party),
and the state must express a quasi-sovereign interest. A state's
quasi-sovereign interests "consist of a set of interests that the
state has in the well-being of its populace," and "must be suffi-
ciently concrete to create an actual controversy between the State
and the defendant." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
A. New Union has Suffered Actual Injury from the Mercury
Emitting from Buena Vista's Power Plants.
Buena Vista has created an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to the public's health from the pollution and contamina-
tion in the state of New Union. A State has standing to sue when
"the injury alleged affects the general population of a State in a
substantial way. .. " Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 767
(1981).
The lower court stated that New Union "automatically has
standing to sue for injuries alleged to occur within its boundaries."
(R. at 7.) New Union claims that Lake Tokay is within its bounda-
ries and public domain. (R. at 7.) Lake Tokay has been poisoned
with mercury emanating from Buena Vista's power plants (R. at
4.) Mercury is universally known as a dangerous substance, with
potentially fatal effects. Lori Haugen, The Mercury Menace (last
modified Jan. 15, 1999) <http://www.portland.com/mercury/merc




lution is to ignore the situation, whereby denying direct responsi-
bility for their actions. New Union's Health Department has
issued a health advisory ordering a ban on the sale of fish for con-
sumption. (R. at 4.)
New Union contends that the mercury contamination in Lake
Tokay poses a health risk to the public, both residents and non-
residents. If humans consume the fish from Lake Tokay, there
exists a great risk to their health. Once mercury is ingested, it
attacks various organs and biological systems such as the brain,
peripheral nerves, pancreas, immune systems, and kidneys. Lori
Haugen, The Mercury Menace (last modified Jan. 15, 1999) <http:/
/www.portland.com/mercury/merclinx.htm>. Mercury can affect
one's vision, hearing, and speech; it can also lead to numbness of
the limbs and possibly lead to coma or death. See id. Mercury
poisoning continues for years after exposure, even after having
been excreted from the body. See id.
Despite health advisory warnings, the public often remains
ignorant. Relying on advisory warnings is not sufficient to pre-
vent the dangerous effects of mercury in the environment. Even if
the public is warned from eating the fish in Lake Tokay, nothing
is stopping other animals from eating the fish and plant life in the
area, further contaminating the food chain. A state's economy can
be dependent on the fishing industry as a means of income and
nutrition. This ban on fish can and will affect more than the local
sportsmen.
The mercury emitted from Buena Vista's power plants is a
hazardous solid waste. The lower court did not reach the issue of
whether the waste caused an endangerment to Lake Tokay (R. at
4.) However, based on the evidence and studies conducted by
EPA, one can reasonably conclude that the risk mercury imposed
on the public is sufficient to allow an injunction, thus preventing
further mercury pollution and contamination.
B. The Injuries Suffered by New Union are Traceable to Buena
Vista's Mercury Pollution.
Buena Vista concedes that "EPA had conducted studies which
conclude that most of the mercury in Lake Tokay originates from
Buena Vista's two power plants in Blue Skies." (R. at 4.) Buena
Vista, however, chooses to deny the validity of the health advisory
which warns the public about mercury poisoning in humans. (R.
at 4.) Buena Vista admits that its power plants release "some"
mercury into the atmosphere. (R. at 3.)
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"The mercury bioaccumulates in the flesh of fish to levels suf-
ficient enough to cause a ban on eating or selling fish from the
lake." (R. at 1.) Therefore, Buena Vista has created a dangerous
situation in New Union, threatening human beings as well as
wildlife.
The injury needs to be "within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute . . . ." Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
RCRA § 7002 offers the protection of health and the environment.
This statute is designed to protect and prevent the improper dis-
posal of hazardous waste. See RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
Mercury is a hazardous solid waste, which is poisoning the land
and water in New Union. Therefore, New Union's injuries are
within the "zone of interests" of the statute.
C. The Injury Suffered by New Union is Redressable by
Judicial Action.
New Union's injuries are redressable under RCRA § 7002.
"The purpose of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) is to redress endanger-
ments." (R. at 6.) RCRA aims to prevent the creation and further-
ance of hazardous waste sites. See RCRA §7002(a)(1)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th
Cir. 1995). A warning is insufficient to protect the public or the
environment from a hazardous substance such as mercury.
"When Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, it... used the word
'may' to- preface the standard of liability: 'present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."'
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (citing United
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213 (3d Cir. 1982). RCRA § 7002 is
designed to prevent improper disposal of hazardous wastes in the
future. See United States v. Waste Indus. Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 166
(4th Cir. 1984). The language in RCRA is seen as expansive, in-
tending to give "the courts the authority to grant affirmative equi-
table relief to . . . eliminate any risks posed by toxic wastes."
Price, 688 F.2d at 213-14.
Imminency does not require a showing that actual harm will
occur, only that there is risk of threatened harm present. See En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency,
465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972). "An 'imminent hazard' may be
declared at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately
result in harm to the public." Id. In the present case, New Union




harm to its public. Mercury is a hazardous substance, and when
ingested causes serious effects on the body, some of which may not
develop for years. Courts have held that "endangerment" means a
threatened or potential harm and there is no requirement of proof
of actual harm. Dague v City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356
(citing Ottati & Goss, 630 F.Supp. 1361, 1394 (D.N.H. 1985);
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F.Supp. 870, 885 (E.D.
Ark. 1980); see also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
New Union is seeking an injunction "requiring Buena Vista to
cease all emissions of mercury from its plants." (R. at 3.) Mercury
has imposed a great endangerment upon life in New Union, par-
ticularly in the Lake Tokay watershed. "RCRA § 7002 vests this
court with the authority to grant injunctive relief. . . ." (R. at 6.)
Therefore, the injury suffered by New Union is redressable. There
is sufficient evidence demonstrating imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to health and the environment in New Union, thus,
the court properly concluded that New Union has standing.
IV. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS, UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT, JUSTIFIED THE COURT'S
REFUSAL TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITABLE
AUTHORITY UNDER RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B).
RCRA permits any person to commence a suit against any
"past or present generator ... who has contributed or who is con-
tributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment." RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). Upon enactment of this legislation, Congress's in-
tent was to provide an avenue for citizen action against companies
who discard waste-like materials. H.R. REP. No. 1491 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238. Buena Vista's power plants
are emitting mercury particles that are being disposed of on New
Union's land and waters, therefore, the trial judge should have
exercised his equitable authority by granting the injunction
sought by New Union.
New Union was directly injured by the mercury poison emit-
ted from Buena Vista's power plants. RCRA allows any party to
intervene when an action filed and such disposition may "impair
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or impede his ability to protect [his] interest." RCRA
§ 7002(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E). In this case, EPA has
determined "that most of the mercury in Lake Tokay originates
from Buena Vista's two power plants in Blue Skies." (R. at 4.)
From this study, it can be reasonably inferred that Buena Vista
has deposited mercury particles on New Union's territory. There-
fore, New Union has a cause of action under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
Buena Vista was never issued a permit for the disposal of its
hazardous waste under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. If such a
permit was issued, and Buena Vista has not violated it, then the
State would not be able to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) if
such activities are specifically permitted. See Greenpeace, Inc. v.
Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1180 (6th Cir. 1993). A
RCRA permit is necessary for "each person owning or operating
an existing facility or planning to construct a new facility for the
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(a). Buena Vista was disposing of hazardous waste in New
Union without a valid permit authorizing them to do so. Mercury
particles, a known hazardous waste, are emitted from the burnt
coal, and travel through the air and are deposited on the soil and
watersheds of New Union (R. at 3-4.) These particles of mercury
represent "solid waste" which is regulated under RCRA.
A. New Union is not Precluded from an Equitable Remedy
Simply Because Buena Vista was Operating Under a
Valid Clean Air Act Permit, and the Trial Court's
Decision Should be Reversed.
The trial court erroneously ruled that RCRA standards do not
apply to Buena Vista because it does not "treat, store or dispose of
hazardous waste," but rather Buena Vista emits it into the atmos-
phere (R. at 8.) The activities of Buena Vista are specifically in-
cluded in RCRA, where Congress authorized a plan for research of
hazardous waste "generated from the combustion of coal and other
fossil fuels." RCRA § 8002(n), 42 U.S.C. § 6982(n). This section
shows Congressional concern pertaining to emissions of hazardous
waste from the burning of coal, and its possible implementation
under RCRA.
While Buena Vista did not obtain a RCRA permit under 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq., it was issued a CAA permit, which provided
for specific emission limits for sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides




cury emissions produced by Buena Vista, but merely necessitated
the monitoring of its emissions in Blue Skies, the state in which it
operates. (R. at 8.) If a company complies with the CAA permit
under 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a), the permit will shield the company
from civil action. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661(f). While a company acting
under a valid CAA permit may not be subject to civil action under
that statute, it does not preclude civil action under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
In 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(7) Congress went further by stating
that if RCRA applies to the polluter, then EPA should take into
consideration such regulations "to the maximum extent practica-
ble and consistent with the provisions of this section, [to] ensure
that the requirements of such subtitle and this section are consis-
tent." This statute demonstrates the intent of Congress, that
RCRA is applicable and should be taken into account by EPA and
polluters. This language does not preempt RCRA statutes or civil
actions that could be commenced under one of its provisions.
Therefore, action taken under RCRA should not be barred by a
permit shield that does not specifically address out-of-state mer-
cury pollution.
The trial court mistakenly relies on Chemical Weapons Work-
ing Group, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th
Cir. 1997), in which the plaintiffs were precluded from a civil ac-
tion because a permit was issued. That case is significantly dis-
tinguishable from the case at bar, being that there was in fact a
hazardous waste disposal permit issued, and that the "Environ-
mental Protection Agency authorized the State of Utah to admin-
ister and enforce ... the program." Id. at 1319. The other cases
cited, including Greenpeace and Palumbo, involved actions barred
because the defendant's acted under valid RCRA permits. See
Greenpeace, 9 F.3d at 1181; Palumbo, 989 F.2d at 162. In this
case, Buena Vista was not acting under any type of hazardous
waste permit, from either the State of Blue Skies, or EPA.
In Glazer v. American Ecology Envtl. Services Corp., the de-
fendant claimed that a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) was
precluded because it was operating under a valid RCRA permit.
894 F.Supp. 1029, 1039 (E.D. Tex. 1995). In Glazer, the defendant
relied upon Greenpeace, to argue that § 6976 and § 6972(b)(2)(D)
did not permit such suit. See id. However, the court stated that
this "holding does not necessarily compel the conclusion that, be-
cause defendant Gibraltar holds a valid permit, plaintiffs' claims
against it under § 6972(a)(1)(B) are barred." Id. The court further
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explained that § 6972(a)(1)(B) does not expressly prohibit an ac-
tion against a permitted entity, stating that such a restriction was
inappropriate considering "the expansive language of
§ 6972(a)(1)(B)." Id.
In Dague v. City of Burlington, the Second Circuit stated that
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) suggests the Congres-
sional intent in 1976 was "intended to confer upon the courts the
authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent neces-
sary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes." 935 F.2d 1343,
1355 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,
213-14 (3d Cir. 1982)). 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) provides for suits
against persons who violate a permit, but in the case at bar, the
Appellants have filed under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), which
makes no mention of the need for a permit violation, seemingly
allowing broader civil action. Following the court's reasoning in
Dague, New Union would have a valid claim against Buena Vista
under RCRA.
Finally, the trial court relies on General Motors v. EPA, 168
F.3d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and United States v. Gulf States Steel
Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d 1233 (N.D. Ala. 1999) in which the courts have
rejected "attempts to use federal enforcement or citizen suit provi-
sions to attack the terms of state issued permits." (R. at 8.) How-
ever, General Motors involved a company challenging the validity
of a permit issued concerning its own discharge under the Clean
Water Act, which was precluded. See 168 F.3d at 1379-80. Gulf
States Steel involved EPA suing the manufacturer for violations of
a Clean Water Act permit. See 54 F.Supp.2d at 1240. New Union
is not challenging the permit issued by Blue Skies, only that they
were directly affected by the disposal of hazardous waste, which is
governed by RCRA. The cases the trial court cites involve situa-
tions in which the "actors" are challenging the permits. The case
at bar involves an injured party not involved in the permitting
decision of Buena Vista. Here, New Union is a state which is be-
ing subjected to hazardous waste disposal within its territory, and
it should have the right to use the statutory provisions of RCRA to
prevent further disposal.
B. The Clean Air Act Permit Should not Preclude Suit Under
RCRA, Because of the Lack of Notice Provided to Those
Injured by the Issuance of Such Permit.
The purpose of the CAA is "to protect and enhance the quality




and welfare" of the population of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401. This is to say, that the legislative intent was to discourage
air and ground pollution, regardless of whether the specific toxin
was mentioned in their permit.
While the trial court finds that barring suit simply based on a
separate permit being issued, "is not on all fours with the cited
cases," it nevertheless erroneously continues to justify its holding,
as if the permit issued under the CAA is binding on potential
RCRA violations. (R. at 8.) The action that New Union asserts is
a violation of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), not
a violation of the current permit that Buena Vista holds. The trial
court relies on cases where "citizen suit provisions do not grant
jurisdiction to the district courts for judicial review of state permit
issuance" (R. at 8.) However, in Dague v. City of Burlington, the
court did not agree with the defendant's claim that it was operat-
ing under a valid state permit, and thus, the suit would be barred.
See 935 F.2d 1343, 1352 (2d Cir. 1991). The court gives a thor-
ough explanation of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B), demonstrating how it should be applied. See id. at
1352-56. They went on to explain that "a state's own hazardous
waste program affects only those actions brought pursuant to sub-
section A" of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1), but "[slubsection B, on the
other hand, is more general, and allows a direct cause of action
against those whose activities [are listed]." Id. at 1352. There-
fore, the action by New Union is not a review of the permit itself,
but rather a suit against the polluter as allowed under federal
statute.
EPA can issue permits to polluters, through applications that
include public notice and hearings, offering opportunities for the
public to comment regarding the affected parties. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7661(a)(C)(6). Neither New Union, nor FLT had notice of the
permits being issued by Blue Skies to Buena Vista. It had no op-
portunity to comment on the permit issuance nor was it given an
opportunity to be heard. Blue Skies argues that it met its notifica-
tion requirement to New Union and all other parties through noti-
fication in newspapers, and to contiguous states through express
notification. (R. at 9.) However, New Union is not contiguous to
Blue Skies and it does not have a duty to read out-of-state news-
papers. Therefore, it cannot be held as a party with notice of the
issuance of the permit. (R. at 9.) Since New Union had no chance
to comment about the emissions permit, and it was directly af-
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fected by the mercury emissions, it should be able to seek relief
under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 7661(d)(a)(2) requires that the permitting author-
ity "notify all States (A) whose air quality may be affected and
that are contiguous to the state in which the emission originates,
or (B) that are within 50 miles of the source." Notice is an essen-
tial element of this act, allowing the potentially poisoned parties a
chance to voice their opinion, prior to the pollution. New Union
was not notified, but its air quality and soil were adversely af-
fected by the pollution allowed under the permit granted. There-
fore, New Union deserves its day in court.
V. APPELLEE CANNOT RELY ON RCRA § 7002(b), RES
JUDICATA, OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AS A
DEFENSE TO BAR THE APPELLANTS FROM
BRINGING THIS SUIT, THEREFORE, THIS
COURT SHOULD NOT RULE ON WHETHER THE
APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUDED.
The Appellants should not be barred from bringing this action
against Buena Vista based upon RCRA § 7002, res judicata, or col-
lateral estoppel. The lower court chose not to rule on this issue (R.
at 9.) Buena Vista relies upon a default decision to grant sum-
mary judgment as a basis to prevent the Appellants from pursu-
ing this action. It would be unreasonable for the court to rely
solely upon the first suit, Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power
Co., No. Civ. 98-27 (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 1999), brought
against Buena Vista. New Union was not given notice of this pre-
vious suit in Blue Skies, being that it was an in-state action. Con-
sequently, the state's interest was not adequately represented.
Moreover in Bluepeace, the court did not rule on the merits, and
there was no final judgment. See id. The court offered the plain-
tiffs the option to amend their complaint, but failure to do so re-
sulted in the court granting summary judgment to Buena Vista.
It would be unconscionable to hold New Union liable for the ac-
tions taken by the plaintiffs in Bluepeace.
A. The Appellants are not Prohibited from Bringing this Action
Based Upon the Requirements in RCRA § 7002(b), U.S.C.
§ 6972(b).
According to RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(A), no action may be com-
menced "prior to ninety days after.., notice of the endangerment"
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has been given to the administrator, the state where the endan-
germent occurred, and to the violator. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court in Hallstrom v. Til-
lamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), explained that "requiring citi-
zens to comply with the notice and delay requirements furthers
Congress' goal of striking a balance between encouraging citizen
suits and avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive
numbers of such suits . . . ." Halistrom, 493 U.S. at 20 (1989).
FLT gave Buena Vista notice. Ninety-five days later this action
was filed. In the interim, Buena Vista did not cease its polluting
activities. RCRA § 7002 does not specify whether the State, as an
intervenor, is required to give notice to Buena Vista. The statute
states that "any person may intervene as a matter of right ..
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E).
In the prior suit, Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co.,
Buena Vista did not give New Union notice of the issuance of the
permits. (R. at 9.) Notice was given to EPA and the contiguous
states. (R. at 9.) However, New Union is not a contiguous state,
but was in fact injured by Buena Vista's pollution. (R. at 9.)
Buena Vista admits that according to EPA, most of the mercury
pollution of Lake Tokay and the surrounding area are a direct re-
sult of the mercury emissions from Buena Vista's power plants.
(R. at 4.)
The present case differs from the facts in Bluepeace. To begin
with, New Union did not have notice. New Union was not in-
volved with the first suit brought against Buena Vista. They had
no notice, and they failed to meet the prerequisite time period,
thus they were precluded from challenging the permit. It would
be unfair to hold New Union liable. New Union had no opportu-
nity to join the parties in the action to sue Buena Vista, and there-
fore, is estopped from challenging this suit. New Union is not a
contiguous state, but it was directly injured by Buena Vista's pol-
lution within its state boundaries. (R. at 9.) In Bluepeace, the
only plaintiff is a citizens group, whereas, here, a state is also in-
volved. (R. at 10.) New Union's interests were not represented in
Bluepeace. Bluepeace deals with an intrastate problem, whereas
here, we are addressing a federal issue, therefore New Union can-
not be precluded solely on the decision in Bluepeace. Buena Vista
will be the windfall beneficiary because New Union had no notice,
and therefore, was not represented in the prior litigation. There is
no mention in RCRA that New Union, a lawful intervenor, is obli-
gated to follow the notice provision. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
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§ 6972. Therefore, New Union should not be barred as a matter of
law.
B. The Appellants are not Barred Under the Doctrine of Res
Judicata.
Res judicata prevents plaintiffs from bringing an action that
has already been decided, whereby preventing a defendant from
raising new defenses to defeat the conclusions of the earlier judg-
ment. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979). "Two claims
are not necessarily the same cause of action merely because they
arose out of the same general transaction or set of facts." Fountas
v. Breed, 455 N.E.2d 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, three requirements
must be satisfied: (1) The parties in the subsequent action are the
same or in privity with the parties to the prior action; (2) the
claims in the subsequent litigation are, in substance, the same as
those in the prior litigation; and (3) the earlier litigation resulted
in a final judgment on the merits. See Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. 110, 130 (1983); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
597 (1948).
Bluepeace, the case on which the Appellee relies to preclude
the Appellant from bringing suit, lacks the requirements to bar
them from bring their suit. See Bluepeace, No. Civ. 98-27 (Cough-
lin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 1999). First, the parties are not the same,
nor are they in privity with one another. Secondly, there was no
judgment on the merits of the case. While the issue in the lawsuit
is similar, it is not sufficient to bar subsequent lawsuits.
C. The Appellants are not Precluded from Bringing this Action
Based Upon the Rule of Collateral Estoppel.
Collateral estoppel precludes the re-litigation of any issue on
the same claim as the first. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 237 (5th ed.
1979). The defense of collateral estoppel arises when "an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same par-
ties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443
(1970). Collateral estoppel operates only when an issue has been
fully litigated. See id. The purpose is to protect litigants from the
burden of re-litigating the identical issue with the same party and
to promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.
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Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illnois Found., 402 U.S.
313, 328-29 (1971).
The rationale for issue preclusion is that the "victim" had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the first suit. See
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 746 (5th ed. 1979). Nevertheless, the
Appellee relies on Bluepeace, to preclude the Appellants from
bringing this action further. (R. at 9.) If a plaintiff could have
easily joined in the earlier action, the use of collateral estoppel
should be used to bar the plaintiff. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). New Union had no notice, thus
was precluded from challenging the permit and participating in
the prior lawsuit.
The Supreme Court, in Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,
371 U.S. 555 (1963), found that if the previous case has not been
"fully litigated" the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar a
subsequent trial. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
555 (1963). Additionally, that issue cannot be re-litigated be-
tween the same parties in any future lawsuit. See Harris v. Wash-
ington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971). However, in the present case, the
Bluepeace court never went further than granting summary judg-
ment. Furthermore, the parties are not the same, and there was
no privity between Bluepeace Inc., FLT, and New Union. There
was no final judgment, and thus, the Appellants are not precluded
under collateral estoppel.
D. If the Court Does Rule on This Issue, Then it Should Hold
That the Cross-Appellees are not Precluded.
There was no final judgment issued, nor was there sufficient
notification given to New Union. Therefore, the Appellant (New
Union) is not precluded by RCRA § 7002(b), res judicata, or collat-
eral estoppel. The plaintiff in Bluepeace, was a distinctively dif-
ferent party than the ones bringing the present suit. Bluepeace,
No. Civ. 98-27 (Coughlin Co. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 1999). A require-
ment of both res judicata and collateral estoppel is that the parties
in both suits need to be identical or in privity. See Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 (1983); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 443 (1970). Furthermore, it is unfair to hold New Union re-
sponsible for the failure of Bluepeace Inc. to amend its complaint.
There was no judgment on the merits, therefore, it would be un-
lawful to bar the Appellants from bringing this action forward.
New Union is not prohibited from entering this suit under RCRA
§ 7002(b)(2)(A). New Union had no notice of the prior lawsuit, nor
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was its interest fairly represented. If the court rules on the issue,
it should hold that Buena Vista is not precluded from answering
this suit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court should find for the
State of New Union in all respects.
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